CyberSec
Final Year Capstone Project ยท Gokstad Akademiet ยท 2026

Cybersecurity Homelab:
Attack Simulation
& SIEM Detection

A multi-stage cyberattack simulation in a controlled homelab environment, using Wazuh SIEM to detect, analyze, and respond to each attack phase. Documented end-to-end as a final year project in Information Security.

Project Progress2/4 stages complete

Last updated: February 2026 ยท More stages in progress

2/4
Stages Completed
3
Wazuh Rules Triggered
4
MITRE Techniques
PowerShell + FIM
Attack Vectors

Lab Infrastructure

Isolated virtualized environment simulating a small organizational network

SIEM Server

Ubuntu Server 22.04 LTS

192.168.0.133

Wazuh Manager โ€” collects and analyzes logs from all agents. Hosts the Wazuh dashboard for alert visualization.

Victim Machine

Windows 11 (Host OS)

192.168.0.173

Target endpoint running the Wazuh agent. Monitored for file integrity, PowerShell execution, and security events.

Attacker Machine

Kali Linux (VirtualBox VM)

10.0.3.15

Simulates the origin of the attack. Runs offensive tools (Hydra, Mimikatz) against the victim machine in an isolated network.

Network Configuration

VirtualBox Host-only Networking creates a private network link between the attacker and victim machines on different subnets. NAT handles routing. This isolates all attack traffic from any real network, ensuring the simulation is fully contained and safe.

Attack Stages & Detection Results

Each stage documents the attacker action, SIEM detection, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping

01
CompletedT1078 โ€” Initial Access

Environment Setup & Wazuh Agent Deployment

Infrastructure Configuration

Attacker Action

Configured a three-node homelab: Wazuh Manager (Ubuntu Server 22.04, 192.168.0.133), Windows 11 victim machine (192.168.0.173) running the Wazuh agent, and a Kali Linux attacker VM (10.0.3.15) on VirtualBox Host-only networking.

SIEM Detection

Wazuh agent successfully connected to the manager and appeared as 'Active' in the dashboard after resolving duplicate agent name, missing auth key, and ossec.conf syntax errors.

Wazuh Rules Triggered

Rule 501New Wazuh agent connected โ€” agent registration and heartbeat confirmed

Key Findings & Observations

  • โ€บResolved duplicate agent name conflict using /var/ossec/bin/manage_agents on the Ubuntu server.
  • โ€บManually extracted and imported the authentication key to establish manager-agent trust.
  • โ€บFixed ossec.conf syntax error: misplaced <directories> tag moved inside the <syscheck> block.
  • โ€บConfigured PowerShell Operational event channel monitoring via <localfile> block.
  • โ€บEnabled real-time File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) on C:\Users\Public directory.
  • โ€บVirtualBox Host-only networking used to isolate attacker traffic from the production network.
View T1078 on MITRE ATT&CK
02
CompletedT1059.001 โ€” Execution

Malicious Payload Drop โ€” EICAR File Creation via PowerShell

Execution via PowerShell + File Integrity Monitoring Detection

Attacker Action

Executed a PowerShell command on the Windows victim machine to create an EICAR test file (eicar.com) in the monitored C:\Users\Public directory. The EICAR string is the industry-standard harmless payload used to test AV and SIEM detection without risk.

SIEM Detection

Wazuh immediately generated two high-priority FIM alerts: Rule 550 (integrity checksum changed) and Rule 553 (file added to system), confirming that the SIEM correctly detected the simulated malware drop in real time.

Wazuh Rules Triggered

Rule 550Integrity checksum changed โ€” file modification detected in monitored directory
Rule 553File added to the system โ€” new file created in C:\Users\Public

Key Findings & Observations

  • โ€บPowerShell execution events captured via Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational event channel.
  • โ€บFIM module detected file creation within seconds of the PowerShell command executing.
  • โ€บBoth Rule 550 and Rule 553 fired simultaneously, demonstrating layered detection coverage.
  • โ€บValidates that the SIEM is correctly tuned to detect unauthorized file drops โ€” a key indicator of malware staging.
  • โ€บEICAR file used to avoid triggering real antivirus responses while still validating detection logic.
View T1059.001 on MITRE ATT&CK
03
PlannedT1003.001 โ€” Credential Access

Credential Dumping โ€” Mimikatz / LSASS Memory Access

OS Credential Dumping via LSASS

Stage not yet executed โ€” documentation will be added as the project progresses.

04
PlannedT1071 โ€” Command and Control

C2 Traffic Simulation & Firewall Mitigation

Command and Control Traffic Blocking

Stage not yet executed โ€” documentation will be added as the project progresses.

Key Learnings So Far

Practical insights gained from building and running this project

SIEM Configuration is an Iterative Process

Getting the Wazuh agent to connect required diagnosing three separate issues: duplicate agent names, missing auth keys, and a config syntax error. Real-world SIEM deployments involve the same iterative troubleshooting โ€” patience and systematic log analysis are essential.

FIM is a Powerful First Line of Defence

File Integrity Monitoring detected the EICAR payload drop within seconds. Monitoring critical directories in real time is one of the most effective controls for detecting malware staging, ransomware drops, and unauthorized configuration changes.

PowerShell is a Primary Attack Vector

Configuring the PowerShell Operational event channel for monitoring is essential in any Windows environment. Attackers frequently use PowerShell for payload execution, lateral movement, and data exfiltration โ€” it must be logged and monitored.

Network Isolation is Non-Negotiable in Lab Work

Using VirtualBox Host-only networking ensured all simulated attack traffic was fully contained. In a real SOC, network segmentation serves the same purpose โ€” limiting the blast radius of any compromise.

Project Roadmap

Upcoming Stages

Stage 03 โ€” Credential Dumping

Mimikatz / LSASS memory access simulation (T1003.001)

Stage 04 โ€” C2 Traffic & Firewall Mitigation

Command and control traffic simulation and blocking (T1071)

This page will be updated as each stage is completed.

Related Content

See the Full IR Case Study

Read the detailed Wazuh brute force incident response walkthrough with MITRE ATT&CK mapping.